EU WATCH: Europe promises new members a place but clings to rules that block the door
Europe promises new members like Ukraine a future inside the EU, but without reform its institutions risk collapse under their own weight, turning bold pledges into another round of empty waiting.
Europe’s current bad boy, the Slovak prime minister, Robert Fico, once an outspoken opponent of sanctions and Ukrainian membership of the EU, declared this week that Kyiv’s accession offers “more opportunity than risk”.
However, the real engine behind the revival of enlargement in recent months lies further north, in Poland’s push to reframe accession as a matter of geopolitical necessity rather than institutional procedure.
With Hungary no longer blocking progress and Poland now nearing the end of its rotating presidency of the EU Council, the institution that coordinates political priorities among member states, enlargement has returned to the centre of European politics.
Geopolitics over benchmarks in the new enlargement logic
But the rules have changed. What was once a slow, technical process focused on legal reforms and economic alignment is now driven by containment of Russia, and the need to prove that the EU can still act decisively in the face of war.
Countries like Ukraine and Moldova, as well as long-frustrated applicants in the Western Balkans, are no longer judged only on whether they meet the formal criteria.
Their bids are increasingly seen through the lens of European security: how their accession might strengthen the EU’s eastern frontier or weaken Russian influence.
Yet despite the new urgency, the process remains slow and politically fragile. As Albania’s Prime Minister Edi Rama put it, enlargement still often feels like “being invited to dinner but the main course never arrives”.
A history of widening
From the original six founding members in 1957, the bloc expanded to 15 by the mid-1990s, incorporating countries like the United Kingdom, Spain, and Austria.
The most transformative moment came in 2004, when ten mostly post-communist states from Central and Eastern Europe joined in a single wave. Bulgaria and Romania followed in 2007, and Croatia in 2013.
Each enlargement tested the Union's cohesion but also brought it new energy. The 2004 expansion, in particular, was seen as a reunification of Europe after the Cold War. But it also triggered debates over labour migration, institutional overload, and decision-making efficiency, issues that still shape today’s enlargement politics.
Enlargement back on the agenda forced by geopolitics
When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the European Union found itself confronting a threat that its usual tools were not designed to manage.
Enlargement, once a technocratic process of convergence and reform, became a test of whether the EU could project hard political power in wartime.
Within months, Ukraine and Moldova were granted candidate status. For the first time in two decades, accession became a geopolitical act.
That shift accelerated in July 2025, when Poland took over the rotating presidency of the EU Council after Hungary. The Polish pro-EU government, under Prime Minister Donald Tusk, made enlargement a top priority.
Tusk has repeatedly argued that admitting Ukraine is essential to Europe's long-term security. In a June interview with Politico Europe, he stated: "Europe cannot be stable if Ukraine is left in limbo. We either bring them in, or we allow others to decide their future."
Poland’s leadership helped break a months-long stalemate caused by Hungary’s veto. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán had blocked progress on Ukraine’s talks while demanding concessions unrelated to enlargement.
Across the EU, the conversation began to change. The rules that govern accession known as the Copenhagen Criteria: rule of law, market economy, democratic standards, remained in place, but the need to contain Russian imperialism overtook legal caution.
Commission President Ursula von der Leyen told EU leaders in June that "Ukraine belongs in our family, and we must act like it."
This new approach has also given momentum to Moldova’s EU ambitions. Georgia has re-entered discussions, and the Western Balkans were invited to a high-level summit in May.
Albania, which is widely considered to be at the most advanced stage among Western Balkan candidates, is increasingly presented as a test case for whether the EU can deliver on its promises.
A bigger EU needs a new engine
The European Union was designed to function with six members. It now has 27. If Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and the Western Balkan candidates are added, that number could rise to over 35. Few in Brussels believe the current model can handle that.
Every major EU decision, on budgets, sanctions, treaties, or enlargement itself, requires unanimity. Every new member gets a commissioner, a say in lawmaking, and a veto.
The EU’s slowest rule, unanimity, is now being asked to manage its fastest-moving crisis. If the EU is going to expand, it needs to reform itself first, or at least concurrently.
As European Council President Charles Michel said in a September 2023 speech in Bled, "We must be ready on both sides by 2030 to enlarge the Union, and to reform it."
The European Parliament has called for a major institutional overhaul: ending national vetoes in foreign policy and taxation, reducing the size of the Commission, and simplifying decision-making.
In its September 2023 resolution, the Parliament warned that “the current system will not survive the next wave of enlargement.”
France and Germany back the principle of reform, but differ on how far it should go. In November 2023, the Franco-German working group on EU reform proposed tiered membership models and streamlined voting, calling the current structure “unfit for a Union of 30 or more.”
Meanwhile, some eastern member states worry that change could reduce their influence. Polish foreign minister, Radoslaw Sikorski, warned when he was an MEP in a European Parliament debate that "we need reform, but not if it leaves Eastern Europe with a smaller voice."
This is the central dilemma: the political momentum for enlargement is strong, but the structure is too brittle. If the EU cannot fix how it works internally, then the promise of membership will remain just that, a promise.
For candidate countries, it risks confirming Edi Rama’s dinner analogy.
The candidate side: who is actually ready, and who isn’t
The current queue of candidate countries is long, but their trajectories could not be more different. Some have begun detailed negotiations with Brussels. Others are still stuck in political stasis, or blocked by member states. Each faces its own mix of expectations, leverage, and obstacles.
Ukraine was granted candidate status in June 2022 and formally opened accession talks in December 2023. It has completed the screening process, a stage in which the European Commission reviews how closely a country’s laws and institutions align with EU standards.
It is now expected to begin negotiating individual chapters – specific policy areas such as justice, agriculture, or environment that must be aligned with EU law – in 2025, but progress remains uneven. The European Commission has praised Ukraine’s judicial reforms and anti-corruption efforts, but warns of ongoing rule-of-law challenges.
Kyiv’s symbolic weight is immense, but the practical hurdles are daunting: fighting a war, rebuilding basic infrastructure, and aligning a large, decentralised state with EU standards.
Ukraine's population alone would make it the EU's fifth-largest member, which raises concerns in several capitals about the cost.
Moldova, which applied for EU membership the same week as Ukraine, is widely seen as the most reform-oriented of the new applicants. It completed the screening process across 35 negotiation chapters in 2024 and was recommended for negotiations to begin in four of the EU’s thematic clusters.
But its path is politically tied to Ukraine’s. Few in Brussels expect Moldova to join ahead of its larger neighbour, regardless of performance.
The Western Balkans and the wait that never ends
Serbia is officially the furthest along. It opened negotiations after completing the screening process in 2014 and has opened 22 of 35 chapters, with two provisionally closed.
But talks have largely stalled due to Belgrade’s ties to Russia and its refusal to normalise relations with Kosovo. President Aleksandar Vučić continues to play a balancing act between Brussels and Moscow, weakening Serbia’s standing inside the accession process.
Among the Western Balkan states, Albania and North Macedonia began negotiations in 2022. Albania is considered the regional frontrunner and has opened screening in all cluster.
North Macedonia overcame a long-standing Greek veto by agreeing in 2018 to change its name from "Macedonia" to "North Macedonia," unlocking the start of its accession path.
Montenegro began accession talks in 2012 and has opened all 33 chapters, but political instability and weak judicial reform have left negotiations frozen.
Bosnia and Herzegovina was granted candidate status in 2022 but has not yet opened talks.
The patchwork reflects not just the performance of candidates, but the inconsistencies of the process itself. Countries can be ahead on paper yet politically blocked. Others meet reform goals but remain handicapped by disputes with neighbors.
The risk of another lost decade
The European Union has promised enlargement before. In 2003, at a summit in Thessaloniki, EU leaders told the Western Balkans they belonged inside the bloc.
More than twenty years later, not a single one has made it. The danger now is that Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia are added to the waiting room, but the door remains closed.
The credibility gap cuts both ways. For the EU, repeated promises without delivery weaken its influence and embolden rival powers, including Russia, which exploits disillusionment through disinformation and political interference, and China, which has expanded its economic footprint through strategic investment.
For candidates, stalled accession can sap political will, fuel nationalist backsliding, or push governments to seek other partners.
Officials in Brussels insist this time is different. War has concentrated minds. But the structure has not yet caught up. Without reform, every promise becomes harder to keep.
As one senior enlargement official admitted privately, "We’ve been handing out boarding passes for a plane that's not even at the airport".
A version of this article first appeared at TVP World
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One thing which the EU lack is its own United Defence Force. Relaying for security on the US led NATO proves to be pointless in the era where the White House is run by the kremlin.
For the sake of the EU security, it is necessary Ukraine becomes a member. For sure. With its most capable battle tested forces, Ukraine is the most valuable addition to the block, not to mention the country's size, population, resources and economy.
The question stays though: Who is going to protect even bigger Union?
Enlargement should pair with establishment of Untied European Defence Force (intelligence agencies included).