HUNGARY WATCH: Orbán's ruling party falters as voters gamble on change without clear answers

Péter Magyar’s popularity is driven by hope he can break Orbán’s system from the inside

With his Tisza party eight points ahead of Fidesz, the nationalist ruling party led by authoritarian prime minister Viktor Orbán since 2010, Péter Magyar’s rapid rise has made Hungary’s parliamentary election next April the region’s sharpest test of illiberalism.

Voters are rallying behind an enigmatic insider seen not for his ideas, but as the best chance to defeat Viktor Orbán.

Magyar’s appeal has little to do with ideology or program. He offers no clear manifesto, remains cautious on polarising issues, and avoids traditional party branding.

Instead, his popularity comes from embodying the hope that Orbán’s system, once thought unbreakable, can finally be challenged by someone who knows its machinery from within.

For many Hungarians, the prospect of real change now outweighs doubts about who Magyar is or what he would do if he wins.

Yet if he does succeed, he will inherit a state apparatus packed with Orbán loyalists and rigged to frustrate any attempt at genuine reform.

Hungary, summer 2025: the system under strain

With less than a year until the parliamentary election, Hungary’s political machinery is under visible pressure. Polls now show Péter Magyar’s Tisza party, a centrist movement named after Hungary’s second river and resurrected by Magyar in 2024, leading with 43%.

Meanwhile, the long-dominant Fidesz-KDNP coalition has slipped to 35%, a reversal that would have seemed unthinkable just months ago. The rest of the opposition remains fragmented, with no other party polling above single digits.

The climate has grown sharper. Magyar’s party faces smear campaigns, criminal investigations, and reports of political intimidation.

Nationalist rhetoric has escalated, with the government using a referendum on Ukraine’s EU accession to mobilise support and pushing a controversial ban on LGBTQ+ pride events in Budapest, triggering international criticism.

Meanwhile, new “transparency” legislation threatens independent media and civil society with harsh registration and reporting requirements, which is part of a broader campaign to control dissenting voices, which EU officials and rights groups see as a rollback of fundamental freedoms.

These measures have intensified EU scrutiny ahead of the European Commission’s upcoming rule of law report.

Magyar’s unlikely ascent

Péter Magyar’s emergence as Hungary’s most potent political force was as sudden as it was improbable. A former government lawyer and Fidesz insider, Magyar kept a low profile for most of his career, working behind the scenes as part of the legal and administrative machinery that supported Viktor Orbán’s rule.

That changed in early 2024, when a child abuse scandal coincided with a shift in the public mood. Magyar seized the moment. He broke publicly with Fidesz, sliding into the dormant Respect and Freedom Party (Tisza) and immediately presenting himself as the anti-Orbán figure Hungary’s fragmented opposition had failed to produce.

Magyar’s criticism of government corruption, especially Orbán’s role in freezing Hungary’s EU funds, struck a chord with voters. His campaign style, direct and unburdened by ideological baggage, contrasted sharply with both Fidesz and the discredited opposition.

Within a year, Tisza surged from obscurity to first place in the polls. Magyar drew crowds across the country, convinced disillusioned voters that he was the one candidate able to break Orbán’s spell of inevitability.

Along the way, he brushed off early suspicions that he was a “manufactured opposition” figure, suspicions that have faded as the conflict between Tisza and Fidesz has grown sharper and more personal.

By mid-2025, with Tisza leading Fidesz by a clear margin, Magyar is the the most striking political transformation Hungary had seen since Orbán came to power, and for the first time in over a decade, the ruling coalition faces a challenger who understands its inner workings.

A candidate without a label

Magyar’s political identity remains intentionally undefined, and for many voters, this ambiguity is a strength rather than a weakness.

As István Hegedűs, chairman of the Hungarian Europe Society, a Budapest-based NGO, told TVP World, “He tries to avoid using ideological frameworks” and sidesteps any attempt to be categorised as left or right.

Hegedűs describes Magyar’s style as a conscious effort to keep out of “ideological boxes,” attacking Fidesz “on pragmatic policy-based issues” rather than offering a traditional program or manifesto.

In place of an explicit agenda, Magyar projects a mix of liberal and conservative themes, but keeps his distance from the kind of “very liberal or urban” issues that risk alienating parts of the electorate.

He is “very cautious to join LGBT Pride events, Hegedűs notes, and on questions like Ukraine’s EU accession, Magyar carefully says “we should ask the people” instead of taking a direct stance. “He is definitely not far right or extreme right,” Hegedűs adds, “and not leftist.”

Magyar positions himself as pro-European, calling for stronger ties with EU institutions and backing Hungary’s membership in the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, an independent EU body overseeing cross-border investigations into corruption and misuse of EU funds, and the eurozone.

For most Hungarians, these ideological nuances matter less than the possibility of real change. “He is the guy who might defeat Orbán, and that’s the most important thing,” says Hegedűs.

Magyar’s strategy, Hegedűs argues, is “to give hope of an alternative,” while leaving his own agenda as open as possible. The result is a rare kind of political momentum, powered less by policy than by the collapse of inevitability around Orbán’s rule.

Why Magyar broke the cycle and offers hope

Public frustration with Hungary’s old opposition, Democratic Coalition (DK), a liberal opposition party led by former prime minister Ferenc Gyurcsány, had reached a breaking point long before Magyar appeared on the national stage. Years of failed attempts to challenge Fidesz had left voters exhausted.

As Hegedűs puts it, there was “total disillusionment on the opposition side.” Parties like the Democratic Coalition and others seemed incapable of uniting or delivering a credible alternative. Each election ended with the same result: Orbán victorious, the opposition weaker, and hope further out of reach.

Magyar broke this cycle not by offering detailed new policies, but by emotion and charisma. “His personality is more convincing,” Hegedűs observes. Magyar’s directness and focus allowed him to cut through public cynicism, presenting himself as the first plausible alternative in over a decade.

Initially, Magyar faced suspicion that he was a “manufactured opposition” figure, an opposition candidate tolerated or even encouraged by the regime to split the anti-Orbán vote.

But those doubts have largely faded. “Everybody agrees now by now that there is a real tension and hatred between the ruling party and Tisza. It’s not just a fake gamble between them,” Hegedűs says.

What Tisza stands for and what it won’t say

Despite his extraordinary rise, Magyar has offered little in the way of a detailed program or governing team. “He does not have a program, you might say,” István Hegedűs notes. Magyar’s campaign has been a “one-man show,” with almost no visible advisers or future ministers.

Beyond a handful of party figures the public face of Tisza is Magyar alone.

This lack of detail has not hurt his momentum. For now, most voters are more interested in seeing Orbán challenged than in scrutinising Magyar’s future cabinet.

Still, Magyar has signalled a handful of concrete priorities. He has called for Hungary to join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, move towards eurozone membership, rebuild relations with EU institutions, and end Orbán’s special relationship with Russia.

In the European Parliament, he has shifted from earlier populist rhetoric to what Hegedűs describes as a “more mainstream, westernised” stance, less about confrontation with Brussels, more about returning Hungary to the European fold.

How this will translate into government if Tisza wins remains unclear. For now, Magyar’s mystery is an asset, not a liability.

Still no to weapons for Ukraine

Yet, when it comes to Ukraine, caution prevails: Tisza’s deputy leader, Zoltán Tarr, confirmed in a recent interview on TVP World that a Magyar-led government would not support providing weapons or military assistance to Ukraine, citing Hungary’s geographic proximity and the presence of an ethnic Hungarian minority in western Ukraine.

Instead, Tisza positions itself as pro-European and committed to NATO, while insisting Hungary must “take our share” in EU and alliance decisions, always, as Tarr put it, with “the safety of our nation” as the top priority.

In the European Parliament, Magyar’s more mainstream, westernised approach marks a shift away from Fidesz’s isolation, but the specifics of his foreign policy, like much else in his platform, remain open to interpretation.

Can he govern? Magyar will face an Orbán state

Even if Magyar and Tisza manage to win a parliamentary majority, the real work, and resistance, would only just begin. The state Magyar would inherit has been shaped for more than a decade to serve the interests of Fidesz and Viktor Orbán.

As Hegedűs points out, Hungary’s key institutions are “full with Orbán and Fidesz loyal people”, from the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court to the media authority and the business elite.

Any attempt to implement meaningful reform would run into legal, administrative, and economic roadblocks designed to frustrate change.

These barriers are compounded by Tisza’s own lack of organisation and structure. The party’s local organisation is thin, and its bench of experienced politicians is almost non-existent. “There is little clarity on who would fill key posts in a Magyar cabinet,” says Hegedűs.

Without a two-thirds majority in parliament, required to amend constitutional laws or overhaul key institutions in Hungary, Magyar would likely find his agenda blocked or undermined at every turn.

Among some sceptics, there are even fears that Magyar could become another authoritarian ruler, though Hegedűs himself is doubtful, emphasising the contrast between Magyar’s campaign and Orbán’s centralised, ideological project.

The far greater risk, at least in the short term, is paralysis: a government with a popular mandate but little power to break through the defences Orbán leaves behind.

Fidesz pushes back

With its hold on power threatened, Fidesz has already begun to deploy the full range of tactics against Magyar and Tisza. The government and its media ecosystem have launched smear campaigns, branding Magyar as a “Ukrainian stooge” and resurrecting old criminal cases to damage his credibility.

Legal manoeuvres, including asset disclosure laws widely seen as tailored to sideline Magyar, offer further tools to keep him off the ballot. Hegedűs warns that Orbán could escalate further, alleging false financial disclosures or accusing Tisza figures of ties to foreign interests:

“That might be one reason why he would not be allowed to run,” he says, cautioning that such moves would put Hungary on a “slippery slope” towards the methods of Turkey or even Russia.

The end of Orbán inevitability

The belief that Viktor Orbán was unbeatable has vanished. Polls now consistently put Tisza ahead, and Hungarians are allowing themselves to believe the regime’s grip can be broken.

Yet the real test is only beginning. Magyar’s campaign has channelled a wave of “anyone but Orbán” energy, but converting that mood into a governing majority, and then real change. will demand more than momentum.

The coming months will reveal whether hope can outlast the obstacles, or whether the machinery built to protect Orbán will ultimately prove too difficult to dismantle.

A version of this article first appeared at TVP World

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