SLOVAKIA WATCH: Slovakia the main loser at NATO summit after neutrality talks shake alliance trust
For a country sitting on NATO’s eastern frontline, PM Fico’s refusal to commit to a clear timetable has undermined Slovakia’s credibility as a reliable ally.
Slovakia emerged from the 2025 NATO summit as its biggest loser, with the government’s blend of slow-walked defense promises and renewed talk of neutrality leaving one of the alliance’s most exposed frontline states more vulnerable than at any point since joining.
Spain may have taken the headlines by gaining an exemption from the five percent increased defence spending target, but it is Slovakia that lost the most at the summit. President Peter Pellegrini formally backed the target in The Hague, yet Prime Minister Robert Fico’s public doubts and revival of neutrality rhetoric have overshadowed Pellegrini’s formal backing.
For a country sitting on NATO’s eastern frontline, Fico’s refusal to commit to a clear timetable, and his effort to keep alliance obligations ambiguous, has undermined Slovakia’s credibility as a reliable ally.
In practical terms, this has eroded the strength of its Article 5 security guarantee at a time when Germany’s intelligence chief warns that Russia may test the alliance’s resolve in the near future.
Slovakia and the frontline paradox
Slovakia, a country of 5.4 million on NATO’s eastern edge, is both a frontline state and a perennial outsider. Its 98-kilometre border with Ukraine makes it one of NATO’s first lines of defence against Russian aggression.
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, NATO has stationed German and Dutch Patriot missile batteries in eastern Slovakia and assigned allied fighter jets to police its airspace.
Trains carrying Western military aid, refugees, and supplies from Poland and Germany pass through Slovakia’s Carpathian crossings daily, making its infrastructure a lifeline for the alliance’s eastern defenses
Yet for all its exposure, Slovakia has never been fully comfortable relying on powerful friends. The country’s modern story is a paradox: it needs strong Western guarantees for its survival, but remains wary of being dominated by bigger powers, whether in Brussels, Washington, or Moscow.
This anxiety is shaped by centuries as a subordinate province, first under the Habsburgs, then as the northern reaches of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and later as a junior partner in interwar Czechoslovak democracy.
For much of its history, Slovakia’s fate was decided in the distant capitals of Vienna, Budapest, Prague, and Moscow. The trauma of 20th-century occupation and shifting borders left a deep suspicion of foreign dominance.
No one personifies this tension more than Robert Fico, Slovakia’s four-time prime minister and leader of Smer-SD (Direction–Slovak Social Democracy), a left-wing nationalist party, dominant in Slovak politics since the mid-2000s and known for its populist and Eurosceptic rhetoric.
Fico has swung from championing NATO and EU membership in the early 2000s to warning that “Slovakia must be a firm supporter of peace and should not be part of any military adventures.”
Just days before the NATO summit, he declared, “neutrality would suit Slovakia,” reviving a slogan that dates back to the 1990s, when then-prime minister Vladimír Mečiar advocated a neutral “bridge” status for Slovakia and kept the country out of Western alliances until 1998.
How Slovakia lost trust in the alliance
Slovakia’s standing inside NATO has depended on its reliability rather than its firepower. That reputation began to unravel well before the 2025 summit, when Fico halted military aid to Ukraine.
In the months before the 2025 summit, Fico began sending signals that unsettled partners across the alliance.
He publicly dismissed talk of a rapid increase in defence spending, insisting, “If anyone thinks that if we give two percent now, and it will be five percent next year, forget it.”
Instead, Fico insisted that any new target must be met “at our own pace,” and that much of the money would be spent on dual-use projects like hospitals and roads rather than armaments.
The ambiguity only grew as Fico revived the language of neutrality. Days before the summit, he told a press conference, “neutrality would be most beneficial for Slovakia at the moment,” prompting immediate backlash from opposition figures.
The president’s office tried to contain the fallout. President Peter Pellegrini called Fico’s rhetoric “unnecessary and risky,” warning, “Let’s not open the door to debates that may threaten the security of the Slovak Republic.”
Polls suggest the Slovak public remains broadly pro-NATO. 72% back membership, according to Globsec, a leading Bratislava-based think tank focused on security and policy issues in Central and Eastern Europe, but the split is partisan. Just 58% of Fico’s Smer voters support the alliance.
These doubts about Slovakia’s reliability abroad have grown in parallel with a striking shift at home.
Slovakia’s illiberal turn under Fico
Since returning to power in late 2023, Robert Fico has pushed Slovakia rapidly down an illiberal path, echoing moves seen in Hungary under Victor Orban and earlier in Poland under Law and Justice.
His government has tightened political control over the judiciary, installed loyalists at the top of the prosecutor’s office, and launched efforts to bring public media firmly under government influence.
New laws and personnel changes have weakened checks and balances, raising warnings from EU officials and Slovak civil society about backsliding on rule of law and press freedom.
“We are seeing the systematic dismantling of the rule of law in Slovakia,” said Zuzana Wienk, Slovak democracy activist, in Politico Europe.
The consequences of ambiguity
Slovakia’s refusal to offer clear spending commitments has left it exposed. In NATO, deterrence depends on the knowledge that every ally will answer the call without hesitation.
By keeping its obligations vague and raising the spectre of neutrality, Slovakia has cast doubt on whether its territory would be a secure bridge or a choke point in any crisis.
“Ambiguity at the frontline creates uncertainty for everyone,” said Tomáš Valášek, a former Slovak ambassador to NATO and now an opposition MP for Progressive Slovakia.
“If allies cannot trust Slovakia to be all in, they may hesitate to be all in for Slovakia.”
That uncertainty has immediate costs. In Brussels, officials have started to question Slovakia’s reliability as a partner for new defence initiatives, including joint procurement under the EU’s Readiness 2030 programme, a European Union initiative to boost defence capabilities and streamline military procurement among member states.
“You cannot have special rules for one member and expect the others to move forward,” an EU diplomat told Slovakian newspaper SME.
At home, the ambiguity has left Slovak industry at a disadvantage. While companies like Czechoslovak Group are investing in new ammunition plants and eyeing contracts with Western buyers, Fico’s mixed signals have already deterred some investment.
In the words of Martin Sklenár, a former defence minister, “If we don’t show we are reliable, others will think twice before placing critical production or logistics here.”
Russian disinformation
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Slovakia has become one of the most vulnerable countries in the EU to Russian disinformation.
Pro-Kremlin slogans about “peace” and “neutrality” now circulate in official speeches and campaign rallies.
On social media and in televised remarks, he argued, “Slovakia must be a firm supporter of peace and should not be part of any military adventures.” These lines echo longstanding Kremlin talking points that blame the West for fuelling war in Ukraine and frame Russia as seeking only dialogue.
Experts like Peter Dubóczi of Infosecurity.sk warn that “anti-Ukraine narratives have become a mobilising force in Slovak politics,” blurring the line between calculated strategy and genuine belief.
In May, Fico was the only EU leader to join Vladimir Putin at Russia’s Victory Day parade, defying warnings from Brussels.
“Nobody will tell me where to go and where not to go,” Fico insisted, framing the visit as an act of sovereign independence.
“For me it is unthinkable that one can be from this part of the world and, during Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, be in Red Square and celebrate Victory Day with those who are murdering children, civilians and attacking other countries,” said Donald Tusk, Poland’s prime minister.
According to a recent AKO poll, over 30% of Slovaks now support neutrality, more than double the EU average.
This has made Slovakia an easier target for Moscow’s attempts to test and destabilise NATO’s eastern flank.
What happens next
Slovakia now stands at a crossroads. The test for the government is not just whether it will stick to the five percent defence pledge signed by Pellegrini in The Hague, but whether it can repair trust with allies who now openly question Bratislava’s reliability.
Fico’s ambiguity on alliance obligations means that Slovakia risks being seen as a soft spot in NATO’s eastern shield precisely at a moment when Moscow is searching for vulnerabilities.
“We are a frontline state, but our politics speak the language of distance,” said Tomáš Valášek, the former Slovak ambassador to NATO. “If we hesitate, others will notice, and so will Moscow.”
A version of this article first appeared at TVP World
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